His Dollar ? Her Dollar ? Their Dollar: The Effects of Couples' Money Management Systems on Union Dissolution and Women's Labor Force Participation
AbstractMost analyses of time and resource allocation in couple households ignore what couples do with their money, assuming that money is “absolutely fungible, qualitatively neutral, infinitely divisible, [and] entirely homogeneous” (Zelizer 1994). If, instead, couples’ money management sets the agenda for household bargaining and serves as a mechanism by which couples “do gender”, we should expect that what couples do with money at an earlier period will have an independent effect on subsequent allocative outcomes. Using three waves of data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing, I find that the money management system a couple uses at the 12-month survey is a significant predictor of both union dissolution and women’s labor force participation at the 30-month survey, net of other predictors of these outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Center for Research on Child Wellbeing. in its series Working Papers with number 25.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
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