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Laboratory Experiments in Political Economy

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  • Thomas R. Palfrey

    (Princeton University)

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    Abstract

    Most of the laboratory research in political science follows the style that was pioneered in experimental economics a half-century ago by Vernon Smith. The connection between this style of political science experimentation and economics experimentation parallels the connection between economic theory and formal political theory.

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    File URL: http://www.princeton.edu/ceps/workingpapers/111palfrey.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies. in its series Working Papers with number 91.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:pri:cepsud:111palfrey

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    1. Ansolabehere, Stephen & Snyder, James M, Jr, 2000. " Valence Politics and Equilibrium in Spatial Election Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 327-36, June.
    2. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 131-161, March.
    3. Enriqueta Aragones & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "The Effect of Candidate Quality on Electoral Equilibrium: An Experimental Study," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 530.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    4. Schofield, Norman, 1983. "Generic Instability of Majority Rule," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 695-705, October.
    5. Kenneth Collier & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams, 1989. "The rationally uninformed electorate: Some experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 3-29, January.
    6. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
    7. Kormendi, Roger C. & Plott, Charles R., 1982. "Committee decisions under alternative procedural rules : An experimental study applying a new non-monetary method of preference inducement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 175-195.
    8. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    9. Kenneth Collier & Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook & Kenneth Williams, 1987. "Retrospective voting: An experimental study," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 101-130, January.
    10. Aragones, Enriqueta & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2003. "Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information," Working Papers 1169, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    11. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
    12. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
    13. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    14. Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
    15. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    16. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    17. Rafael Hortala-Vallve, 2007. "Qualitative Voting," Economics Series Working Papers 320, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    18. Palfrey, Thomas R & Rosenthal, Howard, 1994. "Repeated Play, Cooperation and Coordination: An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 545-65, July.
    19. Richard McKelvey & Peter Ordeshook, 1984. "Rational expectations in elections: some experimental results based on a multidimensional model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(1), pages 61-102, January.
    20. Smith, Vernon L, 1976. "Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 274-79, May.
    21. McKelvey, Richard D. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1985. "Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 55-85, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Gianluca Grimalda & Anirban Kar & Eugenio Proto, 2008. "On the value of participation: endogenous emergence of social norms in a three-player ultimatum game experiment," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 127-147, April.
    2. RIBONI, Alessandro & RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 2008. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?," Cahiers de recherche 02-2008, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    3. Nese, Annamaria & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2009. "Social norms in repeated public good games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 266-281, December.
    4. Pedro Dal Bo & Andrew Foster & Louis Putterman, 2010. "Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2205-29, December.

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