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Review of Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", with a reaction, also on its relevance in 2008 for the European Union

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Author Info
Colignatus, Thomas

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Abstract

There will be many researchers who discover voting theory afresh and who will want to understand it and its interesting paradoxes. Arrow's theorem (1951, 1963) is the most celebrated result in social choice theory. It has been criticized a lot but Howard DeLong (1991), "A refutation of Arrow’s theorem", is a monograph that actually succeeds. The booklet has received insufficient attention in the literature. This review also compares DeLong’s approach with my own book "Voting theory for democracy" (2007) and comments on the relevance in 2008 for the European Union, with respect to the veto power of its Member States and their citizens.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9661/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9661.

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Date of creation: 21 Jul 2008
Date of revision: 21 Jul 2008
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9661

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Related research
Keywords: voting theory; voting systems; elections; public choice; political economy; Borda Fixed Point; democracy; European Union; Arrow's theorem;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
A2 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics
H0 - Public Economics - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-6.

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