This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

An Institutional Theory Of Cooperation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Glaser-Segura, Daniel
Anghel, Laurentiu-Dan
Abstract

The focus of this study is to establish an institutional economics framework of interorganizational cooperation specific to supply chain management. In contrast to transaction cost economics, an institutional economics approach uses social institutions to explain transactions. This theory develops a framework using the causal relationships of interorganizational trust, individualism and collectivism, and JIT/TQM on interorganizational cooperation. Moreover, JIT/TQM is hypothesized to exert a superordinate goal effect over interorganizational trust and individualism and collectivism on interorganizational cooperation. This theory poses a new paradigm to explain the uneven adoption of interorganizational cooperation practices in the industrialized, newly industrialized, and post-communist societies.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9157/
File Format:
File Function: orginal version
Download Restriction: no
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9158/
File Format:
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9157.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision: 2001
Publication status: Published in IPSERA Conference Conference proceedings 11th Annual IPSERA Conference .University of Twente, Enschede, Olanda, (2002): pp. 162-174
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9157

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

Related research
Keywords: Cooperation institutions individualism and collectivism JIT superordinate goal TQM trust.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dawes, Robyn M & Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: Cooperation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 187-97, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.