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Emergence, Organizational Transformations, And Decline Of The Piquetero Movement: A Comparative Institutional Explanation

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  • PONCE, ALDO

Abstract

This paper offers an institutional explanation for the growth, organizational transformations, and decline of the piquetero social movement in Argentina, developed from a comparative perspective based on Latin America. I analyze which institutional arrangements, political actors, and configurations of power contributed to the success and decline of the piqueteros. Applying the basic principles of the rational choice approach, I find that the success, decline, and transformation of the organizational structures of the piquetero movement were mainly produced by a political cycle of deep political division within the ruling party (the Peronist party). Other socio-economic explanatory factors were the over-regulated Argentine labor market, and the exogenous impact of the Argentine economic crisis through relatively high unemployment rates.

Suggested Citation

  • Ponce, Aldo, 2008. "Emergence, Organizational Transformations, And Decline Of The Piquetero Movement: A Comparative Institutional Explanation," MPRA Paper 8748, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8748
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Emanuela Galasso & Martin Ravallion, 2004. "Social Protection in a Crisis: Argentina's Plan Jefes y Jefas," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 18(3), pages 367-399.
    2. Stokes, Susan C., 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 315-325, August.
    3. Guillermo Mondino & Silvia Montoya, 2000. "The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Empirical Evidence for Argentina," Research Department Publications 3091, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    4. Guillermo Mondino & Silvia Montoya, 2000. "The Effects of Labor Market Regulations on Employment Decisions by Firms: Empirical Evidence for Argentina," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 43040, Inter-American Development Bank.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    piqueteros; emergence; decline; transformation; social movement; Argentina;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • P32 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Collectives; Communes; Agricultural Institutions
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
    • J10 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - General
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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