The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts

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The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts

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Bennour, Khaled

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Khaled Bennour

Abstract

This paper extends the prey--predator model of Grossman and Kim (1995) to analyze the relation between the value of the contested rent and the emergence of a conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes the conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That's when its valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compare to that of the prey.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8379.

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Date of creation: Apr 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8379

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Related research
Keywords: Conflict-size;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Khaled Bennour, 2009. "The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts," International Review of Economics, Springer, vol. 56(2), pages 163-173, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Bennour, Khaled, 2008. "The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts," MPRA Paper 15012, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-04-29 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
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Glick, Reuven & Taylor, Alan M, 2005. "Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War," CEPR Discussion Papers 5209, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Reuven Glick & Alan M. Taylor, 2005. "Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War," NBER Working Papers 11565, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Reuven Glick & Alan M. Taylor, 2005. "Collateral damage: trade disruption and the economic impact of war," Working Paper Series 2005-11, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. [Downloadable!]
- Taylor, Alan & Glick, Reuven, 2005. "Collateral Damage: Trade Disruption and the Economic Impact of War," Working Papers 05-15, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-88, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Other versions:
- Caselli, Francesco & Coleman II, Wilbur John, 2006. "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict," CEPR Discussion Papers 5622, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Francesco Caselli & Wilbur John Coleman II, 2006. "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict," CEP Discussion Papers dp0732, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
- Francesco Caselli & Wilbur John Coleman II, 2008. "On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 08-08, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University. [Downloadable!]
Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," Development and Comp Systems 0409007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2000. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2355, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
- Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Frode Meland & Odd Straume, 2007. "Outsourcing in contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(3), pages 315-331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Frode Meland & Odd Rune Straume, 2006. "Outsourcing in Contests," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Stein, William E, 2002. " Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two Contestants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(3-4), pages 325-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kai Konrad, 2002. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1521-1537, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olsson, Ola, 2007. "Conflict diamonds," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 267-286, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ola Olsson, 2004. "Conflict Diamonds," DEGIT Conference Papers c009_013, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade. [Downloadable!]
- Olsson, Ola, 2003. "Conflict Diamonds," Working Papers in Economics 86, Göteborg University, Department of Economics, revised 30 Nov 2003. [Downloadable!]
Sachs, Jeffrey D. & Warner, Andrew M., 2001. "The curse of natural resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 827-838, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Matthew J. Baker, 2003. "An Equilibrium Conflict Model of Land Tenure in Hunter-Gatherer Societies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 124-173, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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