We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counter-terrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implications for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the dictum: ``offense is the best defense.'' Further, it examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
8223.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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Alberto AbadĂe & Javier Gardeazábal, 2005.
"Terrorism and the World Economy,"
DFAEII Working Papers
200519, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
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