Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Bank Incentives, Contract Design, and Bank Runs

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andolfatto, David

Abstract

We study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig Green-Lin model with a strategic banker.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8146/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8146.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8146

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
  2. Edward J. Green, 1995. "Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model of Financial Intermediation," Meeting papers, EconWPA 9506001, EconWPA.
  3. Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
  4. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2008. "Run equilibria in a model of financial intermediation," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 312, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  2. Zhiguo He & Asaf Manela, 2012. "Information Acquisition in Rumor Based Bank Runs," NBER Working Papers 18513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Jasmina Arifovic & Janet Hua Jiang, 2014. "Do Sunspots Matter? Evidence from an Experimental Study of Bank Runs," Working Papers, Bank of Canada 14-12, Bank of Canada.
  4. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2010. "On the fundamental reasons for bank fragility," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue 1Q, pages 33-58.
  5. Arifovic, Jasmina & Hua Jiang, Janet & Xu, Yiping, 2013. "Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 2446-2465.
  6. Kocherlakota, Narayana & Wright, Randall, 2008. "Introduction to monetary and macro economics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 1-4, September.
  7. Todd Keister & Huberto Ennis, 2012. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 179, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Hajime Tomura, 2010. "Liquidity Transformation and Bank Capital Requirements," Working Papers, Bank of Canada 10-22, Bank of Canada.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8146. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.