The War on Iraq in has split the continent into ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’. On Iran, by contrast, the EU jointly acts in the context of a coordinated European foreign policy. The paper argues that both conflicts resemble an assurance game among the Europeans, in which the entailed trust dilemma prevented involved players from cooperating. It identifies the European ‘Dialogues’ with Iran as a regime that reduced information deficits in the case of Iran. In the case of Iraq, however, European players were unable to mutually judge whether there was a hidden agenda or not – and thus opted for defection instead of cooperation.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
7813.
Length: Date of creation: 2008 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in European Political Economy Review 8.Spring(2008): pp. 40-67 Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7813
Find related papers by JEL classification: F59 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - Other C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory F51 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
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