Financial markets and pay-as-you-go social security are two alternative ways to provide for retirement. Voting over the size of social security programs could therefore be partly determined by financial development. In this paper I allow for this possibility in an OLG model where financial development may be hindered by frictions. The main implication of the model is that greater financial frictions lead to lower financial investment and higher social security transfers in the political-economy equilibrium. To explore this model implication empirically, I use countries’ legal origin as a proxy of frictions that may hold back financial development. The empirical analysis yields a strong and robust negative effect of financial development on the size of social security transfers.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
7599.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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Rafael Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2006.
"What Works in Securities Laws?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 1-32, 02.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer, 2003.
"What Works in Securities Law?,"
NBER Working Papers
9882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998.
"Law and Finance,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
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Other versions:
Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"Law and Finance,"
NBER Working Papers
5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)