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Earnings, Coalitions and the Stability of the Firm

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  • Marini, Marco A.

Abstract

This paper presents an economy in which workers hired by a firm receive without cost a firm-specific training that enables them to potentially become independent producers. Thus, this specific training changes a worker's outside option according to the firm in which he works. Under such circumstances, by modelling explicitly the workers' decision to stay or to leave the firm, the paper determines a stable arning profile of the economy. Two main results are obtained by this approach. Firstly, that such a stable earning profile can allow for a vector of wages higher than the basic neoclassical wage and for wages differentials across industries even for initially homogenous workers; secondly, that an industry equilibrium wage depends upon the relative degree of competition existing therein. Both the results seem to match labour markets empirical evidence. Furthermore, a game-theoretic framework is introduced to characterize a stable earning profile as a particular case of core of an economy with coalitions of players behaving à la Nash in the product market.

Suggested Citation

  • Marini, Marco A., 1998. "Earnings, Coalitions and the Stability of the Firm," MPRA Paper 70728, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2012.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:70728
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/70728/1/MPRA_paper_70728.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philip Du Caju & Gábor Kátay & Ana Lamo & Daphne Nicolitsas & Steven Poelhekke, 2010. "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials In EU Countries: What Do Cross-Country Time Varying Data Add to the Picture?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 478-486, 04-05.
    2. Zhao, Jingang, 1992. "The hybrid solutions of an N-person game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 145-160, January.
    3. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
    4. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Ronny Razin, 2007. "Bargaining Over New Ideas: The Distribution of Rents and the Stability of Innovative Firms," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(6), pages 1095-1129, December.
    5. Amir, Rabah, 1996. "Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 132-148, August.
    6. Marini, Marco A., 2006. "The value of a new idea: knowledge transmission, workers’ mobility and market structure," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 697-706.
    7. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Workers Versus Firms: Bargaining Over a Firm's Value," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 369-380.
    8. Feinstein, Jonathan S. & Stein, Jeremy, 1988. "Employee opportunism and redundancy in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 401-414, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco, Marini, 1997. "Managers Compensation and Collusive Behaviour under Cournot Oligopoly," MPRA Paper 31871, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage Negotiation; Oligopoly; Coalitions; Firm's Stability.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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