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Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test

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  • Otten, Jordan J.A.
  • Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R

Abstract

Contextual factors are typically neglected in both theorizing and empirical tests on executive pay. The fast majority of empirical investigations use data from U.S. based firms. Theoretical implications are typically developed, understood and tested on the basis of the U.S. context. However, the U.S. case is not the world wide standard. Pay in other countries is on average considerably lower and have a different pay mix. The puzzle that from the typical use of agency theory can’t be explained is the variance of pay practices that exist not only within countries but also across countries. This paper extends scholars renewed attention to managerial power theory on executive pay. It sets out how and why institutional theory must be included in explanations of executive pay. On the basis of a sample of executive pay packages from 17 different countries we test the theoretical extensions. Results indicate that institutions interact with firm level determinants of executive pay. Explanations for executive pay should therefore account for the variance of pay practices within and across countries. Highlighting that the institutional embeddedness of pay practices play an important role in finding conclusive explanations of current pay practices.

Suggested Citation

  • Otten, Jordan J.A. & Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R, 2007. "Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test," MPRA Paper 6778, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6778
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Winter & Philip Michels, 2019. "The managerial power approach: Is it testable?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 23(3), pages 637-668, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executive compensation; corporate governance; managerial discretion; power; agency theory; institutional theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General

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