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Extending the managerial power theory of executive pay: A cross national test

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Author Info
Otten, Jordan J.A.
Heugens, Pursey P.M.A.R

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Abstract

Contextual factors are typically neglected in both theorizing and empirical tests on executive pay. The fast majority of empirical investigations use data from U.S. based firms. Theoretical implications are typically developed, understood and tested on the basis of the U.S. context. However, the U.S. case is not the world wide standard. Pay in other countries is on average considerably lower and have a different pay mix. The puzzle that from the typical use of agency theory can’t be explained is the variance of pay practices that exist not only within countries but also across countries. This paper extends scholars renewed attention to managerial power theory on executive pay. It sets out how and why institutional theory must be included in explanations of executive pay. On the basis of a sample of executive pay packages from 17 different countries we test the theoretical extensions. Results indicate that institutions interact with firm level determinants of executive pay. Explanations for executive pay should therefore account for the variance of pay practices within and across countries. Highlighting that the institutional embeddedness of pay practices play an important role in finding conclusive explanations of current pay practices.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6778.

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Date of creation: Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6778

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Related research
Keywords: Executive compensation corporate governance managerial discretion power agency theory institutional theory

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General

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