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A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction

Author

Listed:
  • Glowicka, Ela
  • Beck, Jonathan

Abstract

This note provides a simple explanation why sellers rarely set optimal reserve prices in one-shot auctions. In a standard sealed-bid second-price auction, bidders with private values do not bid truthfully if the seller cannot commit to her announced reserve price. Consequently, expected revenue may be lower than without the announcement of a reserve price.

Suggested Citation

  • Glowicka, Ela & Beck, Jonathan, 2006. "A note on reserve price commitments in the Vickrey auction," MPRA Paper 6669, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6669
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6669/1/MPRA_paper_6669.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    2. Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2001. "The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design," CESifo Working Paper Series 534, CESifo.
    3. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
    4. Menezes, Flavio & Ryan, Matthew J., 2005. "Reserve price commitments in auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 35-39, April.
    5. Simon Grant & Atsushi Kajii & Flavio Menezes & Matthew J. Ryan, 2006. "Auctions with options to re‐auction," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 17-39, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vickrey auction; reserve price; commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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