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Information Advantage In Stackelberg Duopoly Under Demand Uncertainty

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Author Info
Xu, Jin
Abstract

We consider a Stackelberg model under demand slope uncertainty in an environment where the follower owns information advantage. Specifically, we show that the second mover obtains higher expected profit than the first mover when the leader only knows the prior beliefs and the follower gains the posterior probabilities. This result tells us that the leadership advantage is dominated by the information advantage when demand fluctuation is important.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6409/
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6408.

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Date of creation: 20 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6408

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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  1. Malueg, David A. & Tsutsui, Shunichi O., 1996. "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 119-136. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Chokler, Adi & Hon-Snir, Shlomit & Kim, Moshe & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2006. "Information disadvantage in linear Cournot duopolies with differentiated products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 785-793, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gal-Or, Esther, 1987. "First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2), pages 279-92, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-11-17.

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