Policy and Product Differentiations Encourage the International Transfer of Environmental Technologies
AbstractThis paper investigates the welfare effects of international transfers of environmental technologies in open economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution, and shows that policy differentiation between the donor and recipient countries and/or product differentiation between the donor and recipient firms play a critical role in obtaining a bilateral agreement on the transfer policy between nations. The results arise from the fact that policy differentiation weakens the strategic relationships in environmental policy setting between governments and that product differentiation weakens the strategic relationships in quantity choices between firms.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6334.
Date of creation: 05 Sep 2007
Date of revision: 20 Sep 2007
Technology Transfer; Environmental Tax; Oligopoly;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-01-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2008-01-12 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-ENE-2008-01-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2008-01-12 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IPR-2008-01-12 (Intellectual Property Rights)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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