How to Divide the Possession of a Football?
AbstractThe current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off or dividing-and-choosing the starting possession can potentially restore ex post fairness. We find auctions to provide a better outcome when teams have asymmetric information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6103.
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Yeon-Koo Che & Terry Hendershott, 2007. "How to Divide the Possession of a Football?," Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 0708-03, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
- Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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