In this paper I analyze the legal regulation of religion in the US and Germany from rational choice perspective and the perspective of new institutional economics and constitutional political economy. Focus of the analysis is on the constitutional framework, legal status and funding of religious institutions and the establishment and free exercise jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court and German Federal Constitutional Court. I conclude that, as predicted by economics of religion, the legal regulation of religion in the US is more economically efficient in the sense that it motivates religious vitality and private religious funding however, this vitality benefits mostly strict churches and sects. On the other hand, legal regulation of religion in Germany, while establishing the de facto monopoly of the traditional religions, lowering religious vitality and translating, via legal system, religious norms into cultural ones, achieves another goal that is also economically efficient: it reduces overgrazing of moral goods and stabilizes social norms, which in turn reduces state transaction costs.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
5887.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description) K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
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