The free flow of global capital has resulted in destabilizing financial crises, coupled with significant redistributive effects. However, the existing literature has not adequately addressed the channels for this redistribution, nor the different factors that influence the formation of post-crisis redistributive policy. This paper develops a microfounded theoretical model that applies the modeling framework of special interest lobbying together with bilateral bargaining to the formation of equilibrium lending, bailout, and reallocation decisions. The paper then takes the theoretical model to the data, testing two key predictions of the model using both micro- and macro-level datasets. Finally, implications for international financial reform are then examined in light of the model's findings.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
5511.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
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