Political Economic Pressures in Financial Crisis Resolution
AbstractThe free flow of global capital has resulted in destabilizing financial crises, coupled with significant redistributive effects. However, the existing literature has not adequately addressed the channels for this redistribution, nor the different factors that influence the formation of post-crisis redistributive policy. This paper develops a microfounded theoretical model that applies the modeling framework of special interest lobbying together with bilateral bargaining to the formation of equilibrium lending, bailout, and reallocation decisions. The paper then takes the theoretical model to the data, testing two key predictions of the model using both micro- and macro-level datasets. Finally, implications for international financial reform are then examined in light of the model's findings.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5511.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Financial crisis; redistribution; special interest politics; IMF;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F41 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Open Economy Macroeconomics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.