The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade
AbstractThe goods produced in developed nations are often of higher quality, advanced technology and better design, hence goods even with little physical mass have higher value than goods produced in developing nations. This means that if the payment is balanced between developed and developing nations, the physical mass must be unbalanced. As a result, developed nations will become increasingly heavier, and the northern hemisphere where developed nations are clustered will also become more and more heavy. The earth will be reshaped like a ice-cream. Using customs data we confirm this conjecture.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 54163.
Date of creation: 02 Jan 2014
Date of revision:
Balance of Payment; Imbalance of Physical Movement; International Trade;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
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