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A new scramble for land or an unprecedented opportunity for the rural poor? Distributional consequences of increasing land rents in developing countries

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  • Hvid, Anna Kirstine
  • Henningsen, Geraldine Adrienne

Abstract

Price induced increases in land rents trigger an increasing incentive for rent-seeking behavior. To analyse distributional and welfare effects of increasing land rents in developing countries, we develop a game theoretic model where a large and heterogeneous group of farmers competes with a small and wealthy elite. The results indicate that only relatively small rent increases benefit the farmers more than the elite. Moreover, political institutions have an ambiguous effect on farmers’ rent share, and may even reduce overall welfare, because they induce wasteful expenditure on rent-seeking.

Suggested Citation

  • Hvid, Anna Kirstine & Henningsen, Geraldine Adrienne, 2014. "A new scramble for land or an unprecedented opportunity for the rural poor? Distributional consequences of increasing land rents in developing countries," MPRA Paper 52919, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52919
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hvid Anna, 2015. "Increasing Natural Resource Rents from Farmland: A Curse or a Blessing for the Rural Poor?," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(1), pages 59-78, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; land rents; agricultural prices; biofuels; natural resources;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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