Workers' enterprises in the case of arts production
AbstractThis paper shows that the standard result according to which labour-managed firms produce a lower amount of output, as compared to profit-maximising firms, is reversed if production per se gives utility and the workers’ membership of labour-managed firms is set prior to market decisions. Under the same hypotheses, the labour-managed firms set a higher product quality than the profit-oriented ones, ceteris paribus. The considered hypotheses are particularly relevant for the case of the performing arts sector, so that the presence of labour-managed firms should be particularly welcomed in this sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 5192.
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
workers'enterprises; labour managed firms; arts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CUL-2007-10-13 (Cultural Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2007-10-13 (Labour Economics)
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