Efficacy of a Bidder Training Program: Lessons from LINC
AbstractIn an effort to accommodate a change in the U.S. Federal Highway Administration's goals towards "race-neutral methods" concerning the involvement of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in procurement contracting, the Texas Department of Transportation created a Learning, Information, Networking and Collaboration (LINC) bidder training program. We examine the costs, benefits, and efficacy of this program using ten years of data, leveraging firm-specific bidding patterns with participation dates. We study participation, entry and bidding patterns of LINC-trained relative to untrained firms. We also analyze market power effects and the survival rates of LINC graduates.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 51329.
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Auctions; bidder training; disadvantaged business enterprises;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C54 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Quantitative Policy Modeling
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
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