Roads or Schools? Political Budget Cycles with different types of voters
AbstractUsing a new Colombian data set (1830-2000), we analyze how changes in the electoral legislation with regard to the characteristics of voters (in terms of education and income levels) has affected fiscal policy in electoral times. In line with economic theory, we show that after the law was reformed in 1936 the composition of the expenditure shifted towards social spending (like education, health, and welfare benefits) but there was decreased spending on infrastructure and investment projects (like roads). Consistent with the literature, we also find: 1.The timing and the size of the political budget cycles changed after 1936 and 2.After 1936 there was a shift in the funding mechanisms from indirect tax revenues to more debt.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 50529.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Political Budget Cycles; Expenditure composition; Revenue composition; Elections; Colombia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAM-2013-10-18 (Central & South America)
- NEP-MAC-2013-10-18 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2013-10-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PPM-2013-10-18 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
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