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Contraintes institutionnelles et règlementaires et le secteur informel à Djibouti
[Institutional and regulatory constraints and the informal sector in Djibouti]

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  • Mahamoud, Ismael

Abstract

This research seeks to detect the institutional and regulatory constraints that limit the development of informal units in Djibouti by both the macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis. The review shows that institutional habits (corruption, going right) in regulation created transaction costs and force small businesses to take refuge in the informal sector. A regression model shows that the quality of justice (as measured by this indicator of Rule of Law of the World Bank) is a determining variable in explaining the weight of the non-observed economy and hence the informal sector in GDP official. The dynamics of micro-enterprises is approached from 2 surveys (2001 and 2005) on the same sample. The analysis of mobility through transition matrices reveals the existence of three thresholds (1 employee, 2-5 employees, 6-9 employees and 10 employees and more) and not only one single threshold, albeit it confirms the thesis of «missing-middle». The discriminating factor analysis indicates that the law is a crucial variable that explains the apparent blocking of micro-enterprises beyond 6 to 9 employees. Finally, the 2007 survey on the money transfer activities (hawalas) shows that these institutions have a significant impact on the macroeconomic level and suggests that their usefulness and specificity should be taken into account in order to integrate this banking device within the formal financial system.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48886.

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Date of creation: 19 Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48886

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Related research

Keywords: Contrat; corruption; coût de transaction; économie non observée; hawalas; légalité; institutions; micro-entreprise; «missing-middle»; opportunisme; secteur informel;

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