Sezession: Ein gefährliches Spiel
[Secession: a dangerous game]
AbstractThe problem posed by a potential exit from a political union or federation of states is not a new one. In the current crisis the potential exit from a monetary union is particularly relevant. Not long ago, potential exit has been an important topic in Canada. The analyses of the consequences of a potential exit of the province of Quebec can also be applied to the actual crisis of the European Monetary System. The results of the Canadian analyses show that exit involves the risk of major conflicts – even if both sides have strong preferences for a mutual agreement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 48725.
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
European Monetary Union; secession;
Other versions of this item:
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
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- Robert Young, 1994. "The political economy of secession: The case of Quebec," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 221-245, March.
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