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Конкуренция Саморегулируемых Организаций И Эффективность Рынков
[Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency]

Author

Listed:
  • Bendikov, Mikhail
  • Kolesnik, Georgiy

Abstract

The effect of competition among self-regulatory organizations (SRO) on the efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is considered. It is shown that under certain conditions the competition among SRO worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to decrease in consumers’ welfare. Moreover, the distinctive feature of the competition among SRO in comparison with other types of regulator competition is that even introduction of alternative government control does not improve the situation. The proposals are formulated for self-regulatory markets’ structure and conditions change in order to reduce negative effects of SRO competition.

Suggested Citation

  • Bendikov, Mikhail & Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2013. "Конкуренция Саморегулируемых Организаций И Эффективность Рынков [Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency]," MPRA Paper 47812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47812
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    self-regulation; state control; market; regulatory competition; welfare; mathematical model; hierarchical system; non-cooperative game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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