Majority rule in the absence of a majority
AbstractWhat is the meaning of "majoritarianism" as a principle of democratic group decision-making in a judgement aggregation problem, when the propositionwise majority view is logically inconsistent? We argue that the majoritarian ideal is best embodied by the principle of "supermajority efficiency" (SME). SME reflects the idea that smaller supermajorities must yield to larger supermajorities. We show that in a well-demarcated class of judgement spaces, the SME outcome is generically unique. But in most spaces, it is not unique; we must make trade-offs between the different supermajorities. We axiomatically characterize the class of "additive majority rules", which specify how such trade-offs are made. This requires, in general, a hyperreal-valued representation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 46721.
Date of creation: 02 May 2013
Date of revision:
judgement aggregation; majority rule; majoritarian; hyperreal; Condorcet;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-05-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-05-11 (Microeconomics)
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