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The Socially Optimal Policy Choices by the Supreme Court – A Strategic Analysis

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  • Mallick, Indrajit

Abstract

Abstract This paper discusses a number of important problems regarding administration of justice in different legal areas and jurisdictions across the legal hierarchies in different countries throughout the world. It is argued that the Supreme Courts can address these problems through strategic use of its policy instruments. The paper discusses a number of important and pressing problems plaguing the courts all over the world. These problems range from litigation explosion, delay (backlogs) and caseload problems in courts, corruption in the judiciary, problems of judicial review by a Supreme Court, inadequate standards of review, suboptimal legal innovations brought about by the judiciary and inefficiently designed judicial hierarchies. I argue that it is only the Supreme Court, through strategic use of its policy instruments, can bring about solutions to these problems and the desirable results.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/45042/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 45042.

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Date of creation: 30 Dec 2012
Date of revision: 14 Mar 2013
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:45042

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Keywords: K0; K1; K4;

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  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Pop-Eleches, Cristian & Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Scholarly Articles 3451311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September.
  3. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  4. Kessler, Daniel, 1996. "Institutional Causes of Delay in the Settlement of Legal Disputes," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 432-60, October.
  5. Landes, William M, 1971. "An Economic Analysis of the Courts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(1), pages 61-107, April.
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