Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace
AbstractThis paper studies how a firm fosters formal and informal interactions among its employees to create a collective identity and positively influence effort. We develop a model where employees have both a personal and a social ideal for effort, and where the firm can make its workforce more sensitive to this social ideal by allocating part of the work time to social interactions. We show that by investing in social capital, the firm can increase the power of peer pressure, make screening among heterogeneous employees less costly and, finally, augment the effectiveness of monetary incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44769.
Date of creation: 05 Mar 2013
Date of revision:
monetary and non monetary incentives; social norms; norm regulation; identity;
Other versions of this item:
- Jocelyn Donze & Trude Gunnes, 2013. "Becoming “We” Instead of “I”, Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace," Working Papers of BETA 2013-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-03-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HRM-2013-03-16 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SOC-2013-03-16 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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