The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type
AbstractThe article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction of risks of investment activity in economy. The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it follows from the behavior of interactive parties. Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the established conclusion.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44745.
Date of creation: Feb 2013
Date of revision:
investors; government; economic behavior; game theory; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-optimality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
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