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The problem of arising the Pareto inefficient norm in relations “investor – government” type

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  • Sokolovskyi, Dmytro
  • Sokolovska, Olena

Abstract

The article deals with problem of forming of Pareto non-optimal norms of mutual behavior of investors and government in the process of decision-making related to financing of reduction of risks of investment activity in economy. The game-theoretical analysis suggests that inefficiency of arising norms is non-casual; it follows from the behavior of interactive parties. Empirical verification based on statistical data of OECD countries confirms in general the established conclusion.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44745.

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Date of creation: Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:44745

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Keywords: investors; government; economic behavior; game theory; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-optimality;

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