Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bar-Isaac, Heski
  • Gavazza, Alessandro

Abstract

We use new data from a rental brokers' multiple listings service to examine the contractual agreements between landlords and brokers. The data display two sources of variation in the way in which agents are compensated: 1) 69 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the other 31 percent are non-exclusive); and 2) in 23 percent of listings, landlords commit to pay the agent's fee (in the other 77 percent, the agent collects the fee from the tenant). We show that contracts vary according to apartment characteristics and market conditions. Specifically, landlords are more likely to sign exclusive agreements with agents for more-atypical apartments and are more likely to pay brokers' fees when apartments are in rent-stabilized buildings and when local vacancy rates are higher.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43967/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 43967.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:43967

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Real estate; Brokers; Rent-regulation; Exclusive;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Sass, Tim R., 2005. "The competitive effects of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 203-225, April.
  2. Che,Y.-K. & Sakovics,J., 2004. "Contractual remedies to the holdup problem : a dynamic perspective," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 3, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2012. "Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 1163, The University of Melbourne.
  4. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 551-572, June.
  5. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
  6. Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-17, October.
  7. Sass, Tim R & Saurman, David S, 1993. "Mandated Exclusive Territories and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of the Malt-Beverage Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 153-77, April.
  8. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2004. "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-board Computers and Governance in U. S. Trucking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1443-1479, November.
  9. Hubbard, Thomas N, 2001. "Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 369-86, Summer.
  10. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
  11. Alok Johri & Lohn Leach, 2000. "Middlemen and the Allocation of Heterogeneous Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-06, McMaster University.
  12. Lawrence J. White, 2010. "Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 211-26, Spring.
  13. Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
  14. Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2008. "Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-611, November.
  15. R.C. Rutherford & T.M. Springer & A. Yavas, 2004. "The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance: Submarket Effects," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, American Real Estate Society, vol. 26(3), pages 277-298.
  16. Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 1997. "The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control," NBER Working Papers 6220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Paul Joskow, 1984. "Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generating Plants," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 361, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  18. Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. Donald Haurin, 1988. "The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 16(4), pages 396-410.
  20. Ronald C. Rutherford & Thomas M. Springer & Abdullah Yavas, 2001. "The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 389-409.
  21. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1993. "Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 937-76, October.
  22. Gavazza, Alessandro, 2010. "Asset liquidity and financial contracts: Evidence from aircraft leases," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 62-84, January.
  23. John D. Benjamin & G. Donald Jud & G. Stacy Sirmans, 2000. "What Do We Know About Real Estate Brokerage?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 5-30.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Philippe Bracke, 2013. "House Prices and Rents: Micro Evidence from a Matched Dataset in Central London_x0003_," ERSA conference papers ersa13p112, European Regional Science Association.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:43967. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.