Brokers' contractual arrangements in the Manhattan residential rental market
AbstractWe use new data from a rental brokers' multiple listings service to examine the contractual agreements between landlords and brokers. The data display two sources of variation in the way in which agents are compensated: 1) 69 percent of listings involve exclusive relationships between landlords and agents (the other 31 percent are non-exclusive); and 2) in 23 percent of listings, landlords commit to pay the agent's fee (in the other 77 percent, the agent collects the fee from the tenant). We show that contracts vary according to apartment characteristics and market conditions. Specifically, landlords are more likely to sign exclusive agreements with agents for more-atypical apartments and are more likely to pay brokers' fees when apartments are in rent-stabilized buildings and when local vacancy rates are higher.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 43967.
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Real estate; Brokers; Rent-regulation; Exclusive;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
- R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Loertscher, Simon & Niedermayer, Andras, 2012.
"Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically: The Case of Percentage Fees,"
Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
435, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2012. "Assessing the Performance of Simple Contracts Empirically:The Case of Percentage Fees," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1163, The University of Melbourne.
- R.C. Rutherford & T.M. Springer & A. Yavas, 2004. "The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance: Submarket Effects," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 26(3), pages 277-298.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Jozsef Sakovics, 2004.
"Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective,"
ESE Discussion Papers
100, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Che,Y.-K. & Sakovics,J., 2004. "Contractual remedies to the holdup problem : a dynamic perspective," Working papers 3, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Sass, Tim R., 2005. "The competitive effects of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the U.S. beer industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 203-225, April.
- Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1993. "Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transactions Cost Explanation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 937-76, October.
- Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2005.
"Market Distortions when Agents are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions,"
NBER Working Papers
11053, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Steven D. Levitt & Chad Syverson, 2008. "Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 599-611, November.
- John D. Benjamin & G. Donald Jud & G. Stacy Sirmans, 2000. "What Do We Know About Real Estate Brokerage?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 20(1), pages 5-30.
- George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2004. "Contractibility and Asset Ownership: On-board Computers and Governance in U. S. Trucking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1443-1479, November.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2003.
"The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1027-1046, September.
- Gavazza, Alessandro, 2010. "Asset liquidity and financial contracts: Evidence from aircraft leases," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 62-84, January.
- George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 551-572, June.
- Alok Johri & John Leach, 2002.
"Middlemen and the Allocation of Heterogeneous Goods,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 347-362, May.
- Alok Johri & Lohn Leach, 2000. "Middlemen and the Allocation of Heterogeneous Goods," Department of Economics Working Papers 2000-06, McMaster University.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1979. "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractural Relations," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 233-61, October.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sass, Tim R & Saurman, David S, 1993. "Mandated Exclusive Territories and Economic Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of the Malt-Beverage Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 153-77, April.
- Ronald C. Rutherford & Thomas M. Springer & Abdullah Yavas, 2001. "The Impacts of Contract Type on Broker Performance," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 389-409.
- Donald Haurin, 1988. "The Duration of Marketing Time of Residential Housing," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 16(4), pages 396-410.
- Masten, Scott E, 1984. "The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 403-17, October.
- Hubbard, Thomas N, 2001. "Contractual Form and Market Thickness in Trucking," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 369-86, Summer.
- Lawrence J. White, 2010. "Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(2), pages 211-26, Spring.
- Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-85, March.
- Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
- Joskow, Paul L, 1985.
"Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
- Paul Joskow, 1984. "Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal Burning Electric Generating Plants," Working papers 361, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Philippe Bracke, 2013. "House Prices and Rents: Micro Evidence from a Matched Dataset in Central London_x0003_," ERSA conference papers ersa13p112, European Regional Science Association.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.