Social Contract, public choice and fiscal repercussions in Athenian Democracy
AbstractIn the present essay, by utilizing game theory we present a model of choice by actors to explain how change comes about. Then by using ancient and modern sources of literature, we analyse the theory of the social contract as a historical phenomenon that first appeared during the classical period of Athens (510-323 BC.). Then we utilize our findings to explain how public choice was practiced under a direct democracy regime in ancient Athens, by focusing on two historical cases: Eubulus and Lycurgus fiscal policy programs in the second half of the 4th century. We found that these policies can be explained as an implementation of a social contract, through which the Athenian citizens were taking decisions based on rational choice according to a wider economic prospective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 43498.
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
model of choice; social contract; 4th century BC Athens;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
- B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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