Pollution abatement and reservation prices in a market game
AbstractIn this paper we set up an oligopolistic market model, where firms invest in pollution abatement in order to increase the whole market size via an increase in the consumers’ reservation price. Moreover, we suppose that the demand function is not a linear one and the resulting game is not a usual linear quadratic one. In the considered model we investigate the open loop, the memory less closed-loop and the collusive patterns equilibrium. Additionally, we examine the social planning perspective. In the case of a convex demand we found the surprising result that the control and state variables have higher values in the open-loop steady state equilibrium than in the closed loop, while in a linear demand case the equilibrium is undetermined. In all cases we find that only if the market demand has concave curvature are the conclusions clear. A number of propositions and remarks are provided.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 42150.
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Oligopoly Game; non-linear demand; pollution abatement; reservation price;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-11-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2012-11-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-11-03 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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