This paper begins with a detailed computational introduction to a classic ACE model: an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma. The paper presents a simple but fully coded object oriented implementation of this model. (We use the Python programming language, which is shown to be a natural ally for ACE research). Using these tools, we demonstrate that player type evolution is affected by cardinal payoffs. We then explore a possible social benefit to commitment, where 'commitment' denotes an unwillingness to surrender a reciprocal strategy.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
414.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Hahn, Frank, 1991.
"The Next Hundred Years,"
Economic Journal,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(404), pages 47-50, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)