Strategic commitment to pursue a goal other than profit in a Cournot duopoly
AbstractCompetition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives for firms to commit to maximize a performance metric other than profit. We briefly review the underlying theory, analyze its ramifications in a Cournot duopoly, and consider feasibility constraints from the perspective of strategic management.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40891.
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Gakushuin Economic Papers 2.49(2012): pp. 133-142
oligopolistic competition; strategic commitment; strategic delegation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-09-03 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-03 (Industrial Competition)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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