Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening
AbstractThis paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who decides whether or not to accept it. First, we show that there exist instances where an agent with a better track record of producing high-quality projects should be subjected to more stringent standards. Second, we show that an increase in the submission fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40847.
Date of creation: 14 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden;
Other versions of this item:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-09-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2012-09-03 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PPM-2012-09-03 (Project, Program & Portfolio Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011.
"Learning More by Doing Less,"
2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-09, February.
- Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
- Barbos, Andrei, 2013.
"Project screening with tiered evaluation,"
Mathematical Social Sciences,
Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 293-306.
- Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
- Barbos, Andrei, 2012.
"Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation,"
40848, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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