On social and economic spheres: an observation of the “gantangan” Indonesian tradition
AbstractIndonesian traditional villagers have a tradition for the sake of their own social and economic security named “nyumbang”. There are wide variations of the traditions across the archipelago, and we revisit an observation to one in Subang, West Java, Indonesia. The paper discusses and employs the evolutionary game theoretic insights to see the process of “gantangan”, of the intertwining social cohesion and economic expectation of the participation within the traditional activities. The current development of the “gantangan” tradition is approached and generalized to propose a view between the economic and social sphere surrounding modern people. The interaction between social and economic sphere might be seen as a kind of Lokta-Volterra’s predator-prey-like interaction, where both are conflicting yet in a great necessity one another for the sustainability of the social life. While some explanations due to the current development of “gantangan” is drawn, some aspects related to traditional views complying the modern life with social and economic expectations is outlined.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 39671.
Date of creation: 22 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
social and economic sphere; traditional village ecology; evolutionary game theory; social security;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
- J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
- A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-07-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2012-07-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-07-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-07-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2012-07-08 (South East Asia)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, June.
- Situngkir, Hokky, 2010. "Landscape in the Economy of Conspicuous Consumptions," MPRA Paper 22948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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