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Selection and institutional shareholder activism in Chinese acquisitions

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  • Peng, Fei
  • Kang, Lili
  • Jiang, Jun

Abstract

This paper aims to investigate the role that institutional shareholders play in acquisition decision using micro data in the Chinese stock market during 2003-2008. Acquisition decision is the selection and coordination process of shareholders as strategic alliances, which is determined by corporate acquisition ability, composition of institutional shareholders and concentration of tradable share (TS) in China. We use Heckman selection model to surmount the selection biases in acquisition decision. We find that institutional shareholders including qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII), social security funds (SSF), security firms (SF) and security investment funds (SIF), as well as TS concentration affect acquisition probability rather than annual acquisition scale. SSF, SIF and TS concentration can increase acquisition probability while QFII decreases it. Our paper contributes to the published literature in three ways. First, we offer a model to understand the selection and coordination process of acquisition decision. Second, we investigate whether institutional shareholders could effectively monitor annual acquisition scale. Third, we identify Heckman selection problem that institutional shareholders could affect PLCs’ acquisition decision on whether to acquire rather than how much to acquire.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38701.

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Date of creation: Dec 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38701

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Keywords: Selection; Institutional Shareholders; Acquisition Decision;

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Cited by:
  1. Kang, Lili & Peng, Fei, 2014. "Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View," MPRA Paper 55766, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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