Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The failure of financial macroeconomics and what to do about it

Contents:

Author Info

  • Chatelain, Jean-Bernard
  • Ralf, Kirsten

Abstract

The bargaining power of international banks is currently still very high as compared to what it was at the time of the Bretton Woods conference. As a consequence, systemic financial crises are likely to remain recurrent phenomena with large effects on macroeconomic aggregates. Mainstream macroeconomic models dealing with financial frictions failed to explain at least eight features of the ongoing crisis. We therefore suggest two complementary assumptions: (I) A systemic bankruptcy risk stable equilibrium may be feasible, besides another stable equilibrium related to a stability corridor, (II) inefficient financial markets rarely ensure that the price of an asset is equal to its “fundamental long term value”. Both assumptions are compatible with a structural research programme taking into account the Lucas' critique (1976) but may start a creative destruction process of the Lucas' view of business cycles theory.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/38474/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38474.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 May 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38474

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: asset prices; liquidity trap; monetary policy; financial stability; business cycles; liquidity trap; dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kiminori Matsuyama, 2007. "Credit Traps and Credit Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 503-516, March.
  2. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2009. "Unstable Banking," NBER Working Papers 14943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Driskill, Robert, 2006. "Multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models: A critical review," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 171-210, January.
  4. Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 2001. "Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in Asset Prices?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 253-257, May.
  5. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00112535 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten, 2014. "Spurious regressions and near-multicollinearity, with an application to aid, policies and growth," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, pages 85-96.
  7. Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Gauti Eggertsson & Andrea Ferrero & Marco Del Negro, 2010. "The Great Escape? A Quantitative Evaluation of the Fed’s Non-Standard Policies," 2010 Meeting Papers 113, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  8. Robert J. Shiller, 2003. "From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 83-104, Winter.
  9. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
  10. Javier Bianchi & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2010. "Overborrowing, Financial Crises and 'Macro-prudential' Taxes," NBER Working Papers 16091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, 1999. "Monetary policy and asset price volatility," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 77-128.
  12. Philip Lowe & Claudio Borio, 2002. "Asset prices, financial and monetary stability: exploring the nexus," BIS Working Papers 114, Bank for International Settlements.
  13. George W. Stadler, 1994. "Real Business Cycles," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1750-1783, December.
  14. Carroll Christopher Dixon, 2001. "Death to the Log-Linearized Consumption Euler Equation! (And Very Poor Health to the Second-Order Approximation)," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-38, April.
  15. Ricardo J. Caballero & Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, 2006. "Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan," NBER Working Papers 12129, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Paul Grauwe, 2010. "The scientific foundation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(3), pages 413-443, September.
  17. Amable, B. & Chatelain, J.-B. & De Bandt, O., 2001. "Optimal Capacity in the Banking Sector and Economic Growth," Working papers 85, Banque de France.
  18. Gilchrist, Simon & Leahy, John V., 2002. "Monetary policy and asset prices," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 75-97, January.
  19. Halkin, Hubert, 1974. "Necessary Conditions for Optimal Control Problems with Infinite Horizons," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 42(2), pages 267-72, March.
  20. Matteo Iacoviello, 2002. "House prices, borrowing constraints and monetary policy in the business cycle," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 542, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Dec 2004.
  21. Jose A. Scheinkman & Wei Xiong, 2003. "Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(6), pages 1183-1219, December.
  22. Takashi Kamihigashi, 2004. "Necessity of the Transversality Condition for Stochastic Models with Bounded or CRRA Utility," Discussion Paper Series 152, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
  23. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
  24. Bruno Amable & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Olivier De Bandt, 2002. "Optimal capacity in the banking sector and economic growth," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00112535, HAL.
  25. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro & Moore, John, 1997. "Credit Cycles," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 211-48, April.
  26. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
  27. Bryant, John, 1981. "Bank Collapse and Depression," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 13(4), pages 454-64, November.
  28. Marcus Miller & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2010. "Leverage and Asset Bubbles: Averting Armageddon with Chapter 11?," NBER Working Papers 15817, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Chatelain, Jean-Bernard & Ralf, Kirsten & Bruno, Amable, 2010. "Patents as Collateral," MPRA Paper 44698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  30. Bryant, John, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-28, August.
  31. Burmeister, Edwin, et al, 1973. "The "Saddlepoint Property" and the Structure of Dynamic Heterogeneous Capital Good Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(1), pages 79-95, January.
  32. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 8973.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13042, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  2. Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 2013. "Goodhart, Charles A.E. and Tsomocos, Dimitros P.: The challenge of financial stability: a new model and its applications," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 109(2), pages 201-205, June.
  3. Jean-Bernard, Chatelain, 2013. "Book review: “The Challenge of Financial Stability: A New Model and its Applications” by Goodhart C.A.E. and Tsomocos D.P," MPRA Paper 45678, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2012. "Are No-Ponzi Game and Transversality Conditions Relevant for Public Debt? A Keynesian Appraisal," Working Papers wp296, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  5. Christophe Blot & Marion Cochard & Jérôme Creel & Bruno Ducoudré & Danielle Schweisguth & Xavier Timbeau, 2014. "Is There an Alternative Strategy for Reducing Public Debt by 2032?," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 61(1), pages 39-57, Februar.
  6. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00818474 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Karim Azizi & Nicolas Canry & Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Bruno Tinel, 2013. "Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00818474, HAL.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38474. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.