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Can issue linkage help mitigate externalities and enhance cooperation

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  • Pham Do, Kim Hang
  • Dinar, Ariel
  • McKinney, Daene

Abstract

Managing transboundary river basins is never easy and usually involves conflicts. This paper introduces a special class of games with externalities and issue linkage to promote cooperation on transboundary water resources. The paper analyzes whether issue linkages can be used as a form of negotiations on sharing benefits and mitigating conflicts. It is shown that whenever opportunities for linkages exist, countries may indeed contribute towards cooperation. In particular, if the linked games are convex, the grand coalition is the only optimal level of social welfare

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 37408.

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Date of creation: Jun 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:37408

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Keywords: games with externalities; convexity; s-core; transboundary rivers; issue linkage; international water sharing agreement;

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  1. Kemfert, Claudia, 2004. "Climate coalitions and international trade: assessment of cooperation incentives by issue linkage," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 455-465, March.
  2. Ambec, Stefan & Dinar, Ariel, 2010. "Hot Stuff: Would Climate Change Alter Transboundary Water Sharing Treaties?," LERNA Working Papers, LERNA, University of Toulouse 10.15.321, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  3. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, Blackwell, vol. 24(1), pages 87-100, December.
  4. Dinar, Ariel & Wolf, Aaron, 1994. "International Markets for Water and the Potential for Regional Cooperation: Economic and Political Perspectives in the Western Middle East," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 43-66, October.
  5. Just, Richard E. & Netanyahu, Sinaia, 2000. "The importance of structure in linking games," Agricultural Economics: The Journal of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 24(1), December.
  6. Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
  7. CHANDER, Parkash, 2010. "Cores of games with positive externalities," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2010004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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