When elders rule: is gerontocracy harmful for growth?
AbstractWe study the relationship between gerontocracy and aggregate economic perfomance in a simple model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation and productive government spending. We show that gerontocratic élites display the tendency to underinvest in public education and productive government services and thereby may be harmful growth. In absence of intergenerational altruism, the damage caused by gerontocracy is mainly due to the lack in long-term delayed-return investment originated by the shorter life horizon of the ruling class with respect to the rest of the population. An empirical analysis is carried out on a rich data set that al lows to test theoretical results across diﬀerent countries and diﬀerent sectors. The econometric results conﬁrm our main hypotheses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36574.
Date of creation: 12 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Gerontocracy; Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity;
Other versions of this item:
- Vincenzo Atella & Lorenzo Carbonari, 2013. "When Elders Rule:Is Gerontocracy Harmful for Growth?," CEIS Research Paper 263, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 08 Aug 2013.
- J1 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics
- O4 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2012-02-20 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEM-2012-02-20 (Demographic Economics)
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