Politics and Consumer Prices in Africa
AbstractThe motivations of the Arab Spring that have marked the history of humanity over the last few months have left political economists, researchers, governments and international policymakers pondering over how the quality of political institutions affect consumer welfare in terms of commodity prices. This paper investigates the effect of political establishments on consumer prices in the African continent. Findings suggest that in comparison with authoritarian regimes, democracies better provide for institutions that keep inflationary pressures on commodity prices in check. As a policy implication, improving the quality of democratic institutions will ameliorate consumer welfare through lower inflation rates. Such government quality institutional determinants include, among others: voice and accountability, rule of law, regulation quality, control of corruption and press freedom.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36174.
Date of creation: 25 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Consumer prices; Political institutions; Welfare; Africa;
Other versions of this item:
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
- I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General
- Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General
- P00 - Economic Systems - - General - - - General
- P50 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2012-02-20 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2012-02-20 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2012-02-20 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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