Reasons for (prior) belief in bayesian epistemology
AbstractBayesian epistemology tells us with great precision how we should move from prior to posterior beliefs in light of new evidence or information, but says little about where our prior beliefs come from. It o¤ers few resources to describe some prior beliefs as rational or well-justi�ed, and others as irrational or unreasonable. A di¤erent strand of epistemology takes the central epistemological question to be not how to change one�s beliefs in light of new evidence, but what reasons justify a given set of beliefs in the �rst place. We o¤er an account of rational belief formation that closes some of the gap between Bayesianism and its reason-based alternative, formalizing the idea that an agent can have reasons for his or her (prior) beliefs, in addition to evidence or information in the ordinary Bayesian sense. Our analysis of reasons for belief is part of a larger programme of research on the role of reasons in rational agency (Dietrich and List 2012a,b).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36111.
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Bayesian epistemology; doxastic reasons; prior and posterior beliefs; principle of insu¢ cient reason; belief formation; belief change;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D0 - Microeconomics - - General
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
- C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2012-02-01 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-02-01 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013.
"Where do preferences come from?,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 613-637, August.
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2011. "Where do preferences come from?," Research Memoranda 005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2010. "Where do preferences come from?," MPRA Paper 36115, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2010. "Where do preferences come from?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001137, David K. Levine.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2010.
"A reason-based theory of rational choice,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000046, David K. Levine.
- Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2009. "A reason-based theory of rational choice," MPRA Paper 36112, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2011.
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2009. "A reason-based theory of rational choice," Research Memoranda 057, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
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