Bureaucratic reform, informal sector and welfare
AbstractIn this paper we formulate a three-sector general equilibrium model where one sector produces a service or good used as an intermediate input in two other sectors. Intermediate input here resembles bureaucratic (in)efficiency/control, red-tapism etc. in light of these concerns we introduce informal sector where wage is determined through competitive mechanism. We show that informal wage must go up if bureaucratic efficiency increases in general or if informal sector becomes less prone to bureaucracy related menace. However, in the welfare front the eventual impact depends on whether labor reallocation effect can outweigh the tariff revenue effect.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 36072.
Date of creation: 15 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
: General equilibrium; Intermediation; Informal sector; Welfare;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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