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On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Villena, Mauricio G.
  • Villena, Marcelo J.

Abstract

The role of whistle-blowing as a mechanism for deterring corruption has been conspicuously neglected in the economic literature. This is quite surprising given the increase in legislation aimed at preventing corruption that includes whistle-blowing clauses and the extensive literature on whistle-blowing outside economics. In fact, we know of no formal economic model that deals squarely with the analysis of the role and potential impact of whistleblowing on the persistence of corruption in organizations. Therefore, in an attempt to at least partially fill this gap, we present a theoretical model for approaching the issue, focusing specifically on the role of economic incentives to encourage whistle-blowing behaviour. We model corruption as a social norm of behaviour using elements of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We use the concept of replicator dynamics to explore the local asymptotical stability of several types of behaviour within organizations: (i) honest, corrupt, and honest whistle-blowing and (ii) honest, corrupt whistle-blowing, and honest whistle-blowing.

Suggested Citation

  • Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2010. "On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives," MPRA Paper 35917, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Mar 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Oelrich, 2019. "Making regulation fit by taking irrationality into account: the case of the whistleblower," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 12(1), pages 175-207, April.
    2. Quinteros, María José & Villena, Marcelo J. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2019. "Whistleblowing Behavior in Organizations," MPRA Paper 99215, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Nov 2019.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; whistle-blowing; social norms; evolutionary games;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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