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Do Freedom of Information Laws Decrease Corruption?

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Author Info
Tavares, Samia

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Abstract

It has been argued that greater transparency is needed to reduce corruption. One way of increasing transparency is through the adoption of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. This paper uses the introduction of FOI laws as a natural experiment to determine their effect on corruption. Using a sample of democratic countries and two different corruption indices, I find that countries that adopted FOI laws saw an increase in corruption. Results are robust throughout different specifications. Moreover, I find that countries with plurality systems potentially experienced a decrease in corruption following the adoption of FOI legislation. Having a parliamentary system, however, had no impact on the effect of the reform.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3560/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3560.

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Date of creation: 02 May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:3560

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Related research
Keywords: Corruption freedom of information transparency accountability

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K39 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Other
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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