Choosing Electoral Rules in the Presence of Corruption
AbstractCorruption is a problem that has been shown to adversely affect a country’s development. Recent studies have shown that a country’s electoral system can affect its corruption level. But if that is the case, then electoral rules could be chosen to maximize opportunities for corruption. This paper uses the recent wave of democratization and the resulting writing of new constitutions, which entailed in many cases the adoption of a new electoral system, to analyze the choice of electoral rules. Results suggest that more corrupt countries are more likely to adopt a plurality system than less corrupt ones.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 3559.
Date of creation: 06 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
corruption; electoral system; government; democracy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-06-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2007-06-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2007-06-18 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-06-18 (Regulation)
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