This paper discusses the financial risks faced by the UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF) and what, if anything, it can do about them. It draws lessons from the regulatory regimes under which other financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, operate and asks why pension funds are treated differently. It also reviews the experience with other government-sponsored insurance schemes, such as the US Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, upon which the PPF is modelled. We conclude that the PPF will live under the permanent risk of insolvency as a consequence of the moral hazard, adverse selection, and, especially, systemic risks that it faces.
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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number
3498.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions G0 - Financial Economics - - General
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