Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory
AbstractThe paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33808.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Studi e Note di Economia 2.14(2009): pp. 187-210
game theory; mechanism design; refinements of Nash equilibrium; antitrust law; John Harsanyi;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
- B13 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Neoclassical through 1925 (Austrian, Marshallian, Walrasian, Stockholm School)
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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