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Three alternative (?) stories on the late 20th-century rise of game theory

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  • Giocoli, Nicola

Abstract

The paper presents three different reconstructions of the 1980s boom of game theory and its rise to the present status of indispensable tool-box for modern economics. The first story focuses on the Nash refinements literature and on the development of Bayesian games. The second emphasizes the role of antitrust case law, and in particular of the rehabilitation, via game theory, of some traditional antitrust prohibitions and limitations which had been challenged by the Chicago approach. The third story centers on the wealth of issues classifiable under the general headline of "mechanism design" and on the game theoretical tools and methods which have been applied to tackle them. The bottom lines are, first, that the three stories need not be viewed as conflicting, but rather as complementary, and, second, that in all stories a central role has been played by John Harsanyi and Bayesian decision theory.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33808/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33808.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published in Studi e Note di Economia 2.14(2009): pp. 187-210
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33808

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Related research

Keywords: game theory; mechanism design; refinements of Nash equilibrium; antitrust law; John Harsanyi;

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References

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  1. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2003. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Law and Economics 0303006, EconWPA.
  2. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, Fall.
  3. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Rizvi, S Abu Turab, 1994. "Game Theory to the Rescue?," Contributions to Political Economy, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(0), pages 1-28.
  5. Nicola Giocoli, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 639-666, Winter.
  6. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1978. "Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(3), pages 595-604, October.
  7. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  8. R. Myerson., 2010. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 6.
  9. Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
  10. Giocoli, Nicola, 2005. "Mathematics as the role model for neoclassical economics (Blanqui Lecture)," MPRA Paper 33806, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  12. Reder, Melvin W, 1982. "Chicago Economics: Permanence and Change," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(1), pages 1-38, March.
  13. Kovacic, William E, 1992. "The Influence of Economics on Antitrust Law," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(2), pages 294-306, April.
  14. Giocoli, Nicola, 2008. "Competition vs. property rights: American antitrust law, the Freiburg School and the early years of European competition policy," MPRA Paper 33807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. Nicola Giocoli, 2001. "Fixing the point: the contribution of early game theory to the tool-box of modern economics," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 1-39.
  16. Schotter, Andrew & Schwodiauer, Gerhard, 1980. "Economics and the Theory of Games: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 479-527, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Giocoli, Nicola, 2011. "From Wald to Savage: homo economicus becomes a Bayesian statistician," MPRA Paper 34117, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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