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Network security

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  • Larson, Nathan

Abstract

In a variety of settings, some payoff-relevant item spreads along a network of connected individuals. In some cases, the item will benefit those who receive it (for example, a music download, a stock tip, news about a new research funding source, etc.) while in other cases the impact may be negative (for example, viruses, both biological and electronic, financial contagion, and so on). Often, good and bad items may propagate along the same networks, so individuals must weigh the costs and benefits of being more or less connected to the network. The situation becomes more complicated (and more interesting) if individuals can also put effort into security, where security can be thought of as a screening technology that allows an individual to keep getting the benefits of network connectivity while blocking out the bad items. Drawing on the network literatures in economics, epidemiology, and applied math, we formulate a model of network security that can be used to study individual incentives to expand and secure networks and characterize properties of a symmetric equilibrium.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 32822.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32822

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Related research

Keywords: social networks; network security; network robustness; contagion; random graphs;

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  1. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  2. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  3. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  4. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521857406.
  5. Sanjeev Goyal, 2007. "Introduction to Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks
    [Connections: An Introduction to the Economics of Networks]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
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Cited by:
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Azarakhsh Malekian & Asuman Ozdaglar, 2013. "Network Security and Contagion," NBER Working Papers 19174, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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